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Abstract A significant percentage of the global population does not yet have access to
safe drinking water, sufficient food or energy to live in dignity. There is a continuous
struggle to allocate the earth’s resources among users and uses. This article argues that
distributional problems have two faces: access to basic resources or ecospace; and, the
allocation of environmental resources, risks, burdens, and responsibilities for causing
problems. Furthermore, addressing problems of access and allocation often requires access
to social processes (science, movements and law). Analysts, however, have tended to take
a narrow, disciplinary approach although an integrated conceptual approach may yield
better answers. This article proposes a multi-disciplinary perspective to the problem of
access and allocation and illustrates its application to water management and climate
change.
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1 Introduction: the two faces of distributional problems
Globally, while human society is developing rapidly, distributional problems persist. These
distributional problems have two faces. The first face is the lack of access to basic
resources: 1–2 billion people do not have access to potable drinking water and sanitation
facilities; more than 2 billion do not have access to energy services. The lack of access to
basic necessities such as food, water, shelter and energy threatens human security (e.g. UN
Energy 2005; Modi et al. 2005). Access is a problem not only significant among countries
but also within them.
The second face is how resources are distributed among and between communities and
nations over and above the issue of access to minimum resources. Many distributional
problems are historical, reflecting social discrimination, conquests, colonization, and
processes consolidating land and water ownership in the hands of the few. In recent
decades, globalization and global governance processes (e.g. eco-labelling, intellectual
property rights, access and benefit sharing in the biodiversity regime) often have had
intended or unintended impacts on vulnerable or otherwise disadvantaged communities and
nations. These processes have led to the concentration of wealth and power. Since envi-
ronmental resources and economic wealth are often closely related, control over such
resources becomes a paramount motivating factor in political economy.
The problem of access and allocation is thus central to earth system governance (Bi-
ermann 2007; Biermann et al. 2009, 2010). This article proposes a multi-disciplinary
perspective, develops a conceptual framework, and shows briefly how such a perspective
can be applied by examining two cases: climate change and fresh water.
These two cases were chosen since although they are different they pose some similar
problems when it comes to the issue of access and allocation. While water governance goes
back more than five thousand years, climate change governance has been on the agenda for
only two decades. While water governance was primarily seen as a local issue, the com-
mon hydrological cycle, the cumulative impacts of water use and misuse, and the com-
parative problems and patterns of water management in different parts of the world are
increasingly demonstrating the global nature of the water problem. Climate change gov-
ernance was seen from the early 1990s as a global governance issue that needed to be
complemented by governance at other administrative levels. Despite these differences,
there are similarities. Water and climate governance focus on managing scarce resources;
clean water in the first case, and in the case of climate change, the scarce resource is the
‘ecospace’1. Both include complex distributional issues regarding how these scarce
resources should be shared between communities and countries. Both the water and climate
change regimes must deal with issues of who gets what, according to contested principles,
and subject to social relations and pressures. As such, these two issues offer good cases for
this article, allowing for comparison of the way in which access and allocation are dealt
with in the two different subject areas.
1 Ecospace or environmental utilization space is a concept used to denote the total amount of resources
available for use or the total amount of the sink available for the disposal of wastes.
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2 Access and allocation
Access and allocation are closely intertwined. This section elaborates on how different
disciplinary approaches lead to different articulations of these two closely related issues.
Political science scholars often define these in terms of who gets what, when, where and
how. Legal scholars may focus on norms and normative forcing. Economists deal with
markets and pricing mechanisms. Sociologists emphasize how justice is locally negotiated
and defined and the role of social relations and movements in this (Dryzek 2000; Rorty
1992; Elster 1992, 2006). A geographical perspective would explore the consequences of
physical location and identify areas of high vulnerability. Natural scientists may study how
to deal with the physical, chemical, and biological limits to access. An earth system
governance approach merges these different perspectives to study access and allocation in
an interdisciplinary and integrated way at multiple levels. Table 1 below sets out an initial
conceptual framework on access and allocation.
This article defines access in terms of the ability of individuals to secure a basic
minimum of resources and ecospace. This can be implemented through a market mecha-
nism in societies where all have adequate resources to pay for these services. Where this is
not the case, the notion of human rights and/or free, subsidized or rationed access to a
certain minimum amount of basic resources for the poorest could be appropriate. Access to
basic resources can also be enhanced by technological options, or limited by physical
shortage.
The concept of human rights recognizes the basic rights and freedoms of every human
being to live in dignity. Human rights have existed for long, are found in different systems
of governance, in philosophical works (e.g. Paine, Mill, Hegel) and have been promoted by
social movements led by Gandhi, the Red Cross, Amnesty International and indigenous
peoples groups—to name a few. Human rights are recognized in national and international
legal instruments, but have not always been explicitly articulated in terms of the basic
rights for water, food, shelter, and sanitation. In recent years a needs based perspective has
been given impetus with the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000.
Likewise a rights based approach has been encouraged since 2008 under the auspices of the
UN Human Rights Council.
Allocation goes beyond the issue of meeting basic needs and looks at how the remainder
of the resources can best be divided among people and countries. Allocation thus has three
dimensions: how (a) resources are shared; (b) risks and burdens are distributed; and, (c)
responsibilities for causing environmental problems. The first dimension focuses on how
land, water, minerals including oil, forests, species and ecosystems and their services are
shared. The second and third looks at how problem situations are dealt with from the
perspective of the ‘affected’ and the ‘responsible’, respectively.
Early mercantilists who accessed foreign resources through trade found that access and
allocation issues eased with ownership or concession contracts and that led to colonization.
Post-colonization claims over mines and lands led the newly independent states to
nationalize these assets or call for permanent sovereignty over natural resources (Schrijver
1995). Access to and allocation of rights from mines, forests and the resources within them
and access to legal systems of justice were then gradually institutionalized through trade
rules (which enabled any person/organization from anywhere in the world to have access to
such resources if these resources were to be open for private sector participation or were
available for purchase) and investment agreements (which enabled foreign investors to be
able to go to international arbitration to protect their investments; Tienhaara 2009).
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At the international level, principles of resource sharing are dealt with through sover-
eignty. The principle of absolute territorial sovereignty allowed countries to own every-
thing within their jurisdiction and to do what they liked with it. This principle is now
subject to the idea that no harm should be caused to others (principle of limited territorial
sovereignty; the ‘no harm’ principle). At the national level, while initially countries
appeared to have sovereignty, this sovereignty has been pierced through trade and
investment agreements that grant foreigners many rights to resources (principle of non-
discrimination) within countries (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Agnew 2005).
Within countries, historical access and ownership rules led to a concentration of power
and access to resources in the hands of the few—who also had a key role in institution-
alizing rules that protected these rights. In Scotland, for example, land ownership is
Table 1 Towards a multi-disciplinary governance framework on access and allocation
Discipline Issues Access Allocation
Inter-
disciplinary
Whether the basic needs of
humans should be met and
what these needs are; what
instruments can be used to
ensure that these needs are
met?
How are environmental
resources shared; how are
risks and burdens distributed;
how are responsibilities for
causing environmental
problems allocated?
What is the role of science, social actors and movements, and
power in promoting discourses?
Political
science
Who gets what, when,
where, and why?
How should the poorest be
dealt with? How do they
represent their interests? Who
resists efforts to guarantee
access, and why?
How does allocation of
resources amongst social
actors take place? What
factors influence this?
Law What principles are
relevant and how can
these be implemented?
Is a human rights’ (or a human
needs) approach appropriate?
How do equity principles
interact with existing
ownership principles in
determining allocation?
Economics What role does the
market and market
based instruments
play?
Can subsidies and incentives
deal with the issue of access?
How do production-
consumption relationships
affect access?
Is the market able to allocate
resources? Can market-based
instruments help in re-
distribution in so far as that is
needed?
Sociology What role do social
relations and
movements play?
How do social relations
influence rights of access?
How have social movements
affected access?
How do social relations and
movements shape the
institutions that allocate
benefits, risks and burdens?
What are the outcomes in
terms of gender, class and
ethnicity?
Geography Where are the most
vulnerable people
located?
How does physical location
influence access?
How can challenges of scale in
allocation issues be
addressed?
Natural
scientists
What physical,
biological, geological
and chemical
characteristics
determine access?
Are there physical limits to
specific resources that
hamper access?
Are there physical
characteristics of a specific
resource or problem that
shapes allocation rules?
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concentrated in the hands of a very small minority even today. In many common law
countries, similar patterns of concentration of land and water ownership can be seen.
Efforts to redistribute such land and water rights are taking place in different parts of the
world in different ways (e.g. South Africa, Zimbabwe).
The challenges of the distribution of burdens and risks, and responsibilities for envi-
ronmental problems are relatively new; however, past inequities often become exacerbated
by new inequities. With industrialization, actions in one area can have impacts elsewhere.
With globalization, actions in one country can have impacts in other countries. The bur-
dens and risks of these actions are distributed unequally. At present, there are no clear
mechanisms for allocating responsibilities for dealing with these risks. The ‘polluter pays’
principle adopted within the OECD has a limited geographical applicability and is mostly
defined in terms of cost-internalization and not in terms of compensating victims. The no-
harm and liability principles have been developed in some countries and at the interna-
tional level, but their application to global environmental problems has been limited.
Anand (2004) explores how environmental justice has been dealt with in three regimes—
climate change, ozone politics and the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes to
argue that no clear pattern of rules exists. She argues, based on considerable literature, that
the dominant environmental paradigm today has a number of elements. It institutionalises
unequal enforcement, trades human health for profit, places the burden of proof on the
victims and not the polluting industries, legitimates human exposure to harmful chemical
and hazardous substances, promotes unsafe technology, exploits the vulnerability of dis-
enfranchized communities, subsidises ecological destruction, delays clean up action, and
fails to develop pollution prevention as the overarching and dominant strategy. In contrast,
the environmental justice paradigm would enhance public participation in decision-mak-
ing, empower communities, build infrastructures for promoting justice and sustainable
communities, promote holistic approaches to health, develop risk reduction strategies,
privilege social to economic profits, and seek equitable distribution (Anand 2004, 11).
A third element is access to social processes which includes access to social movements
and systems of justice that mobilize both human capital and technical and technological
solutions to the problem. Although the notion of human rights and/or subsidized access to
basic resources may help to conceptually guarantee access, in practice there are many
challenges. Why should societies adopt such rights and/or offer or allow access to basic
needs free of cost? How can such access and principles of allocation be implemented?
Access and allocation also depend on the role of social actors, coalitions, and move-
ments in debating, promoting and pushing for these ideas, mobilizing resources, science
and technology and actually ensuring implementation of such ideas (Dryzek 2000; Young
2001). This is where the study of actors and how they promote specific discourses at
different levels of governance and spatial locations is needed (Lebel et al. 2005; Dore and
Lebel 2010a). Domestic and transnational civil society organizations, as well as individ-
uals, can, through their protests, appeals, use of media, advocacy, lobbying and litigation
activities as well as through promoting greater technical research impact access conditions.
More subtly, sympathetic local government officials may behave in ways that moderate
and even counter central government policies out of concerns for livelihoods and allow
technically ‘illegal access’ on humanitarian grounds as part of routine operations, or in
continuation of past social practices. Thus, in areas where people live in protected areas or
forest reserves without tenure and rights to farm land, local authorities may respect local
systems of property rights including access to land, trees and water. Access in practice and
on paper can diverge substantially in the real world, and often do so, in developing
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countries and remote locations, thus creating plural systems of law and governance (Ribot
and Peluso 2003; Neef et al. 2006).
Rights are not self-enforcing: rights without access to systems of implementation and
justice are meaningless. Thus, if human rights are accepted, there needs to be access to
systems of justice at national and international level to ensure implementation of those
rights. Pro bono litigation can help secure implementation of rights for the poorest,
especially where the locus standi issue is resolved. Similarly, allocation issues often are
mired in historical systems of rights (e.g. the case of the Nile). Reallocating resources may
call for changes in science, discourses, and/or social movements in order to shift from past
patterns of ownership in a fair manner. However, some of these challenges can perhaps be
addressed by scientific and technical research on enhancing the efficiency or substitution of
resource use. Figure 1 tries to incorporate the main ideas in the above text in a conceptual
framework.
Fig. 1 An initial conceptual framework for the role of institutions and governance in shaping individual
access to and allocation of resources (and ecospace) in the earth system
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3 Water governance
We now turn to our first case study on water governance and study this in terms of access
and allocation. Following a brief history of water governance, this section discusses the
access and allocation challenges in water governance and the role of social movements and
science in water governance. Governance on water goes back thousands of years. Rules on
access and allocation can be found in ancient Hindu law (e.g. Donger and Smith 1991
(translation) and politics (Rangarajan 1987 (translation): 73–74), Islamic law (e.g. Naff
2008) and Roman law (e.g. Caponera 1992). In common law, ‘stripped to its essentials the
riparian rights doctrine means that the only ones who hold the right to use water are those
who have access to it through ownership of land’ (Teclaff 1985: 6). Access and allocation
has been based on community solidarity (Hindu law), right of thirst (Islamic law), basic
needs (communism), land ownership (riparianism), prior appropriation, and increasingly
through licenses or payment.
There is a constant struggle between those who see water as a resource that should be
harnessed for development (the big development banks, irrigation officials and farmers);
having multiple functions and ecosystem services; or a living being. Water governance at
national level often consists of a complex of rules and regulations. Relatively few
developing countries have an integrated water policy (e.g. Brazil, South Africa), while
many of the 150 or so developing countries have highly pluralist water law systems (e.g. in
Africa). In developed countries such systems often take water rights and water allocation
principles into account, although the rights of indigenous peoples may be contested—and
the basic sanitation rights of about 20 million European Union citizens especially in the
new member countries have not yet been met (WECF 2008). In many developing coun-
tries, water access remains a critical challenge as more than 1.2 billion people lack access,
and allocation between the different sectors is disputed because of the scarcity of water
resources (Molle et al. 2009; Dellapenna and Gupta 2009).
Access to water for drinking and sanitation purposes is critical for human health,
productivity and dignity. The burden of lack of access falls mostly on women and children.
Basic needs amount to about 15–20 (UNHCR) to 50 l (WHO) per person per day
depending on the body that makes these calculations. The Millennium Development Goals
of 2000 acknowledged the need to politically prioritize this problem, the UN Human
Rights Council set in motion a process to further elaborate on these rights in 2008, and in
July 2010 the UN General Assembly has adopted a Resolution on the Human Right to
Water and Sanitation.
For legal scholars, the access problem is one of water rights (e.g. Bourquain 2008); for
economists one of water pricing, subsidies and private sector participation; for engineers
one of infrastructural solutions (e.g. dams, interbasin transfers); for sociologists the chal-
lenge is to find ways to negotiate institutional solutions (Lebel et al. 2007) for multidis-
ciplinary scholars on how infrastructural solutions and governance are interlocked (Gupta
and van der Zaag 2008).
The human right to water has been discussed extensively in the literature (Smets 2000;
McCaffrey 1992; Hildering 2005) and adopted in UN circles (General comment 2002).
Access to water can also be guaranteed by price variations and subsidies for the poor and
this has been undertaken in many countries. At the UN Conference on Environment and
Development of 1992 (UNCED 1992: para 18.8), a compromise between the human rights
and the economic good idea was adopted. However, in practice in the 1990s and early
2000s, there was considerable pressure for water privatization and as a result the price of
water increased (Barlow and Clarke 2002; Petrella 2001) and marginalized groups have
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been further disempowered. This has led to arbitration following breach of contracts
(Tecco 2008; Schouten and Schwartz 2006).
Allocation of water is about (a) how water resources are shared between different uses
and sectors, (b) how risks are shared, and (c) how responsibilities for causing problems are
shared. These are issues that call for more systematic research.
Societies have traditionally laid down rules about how to share water across different
uses. At international level, there is a rich history of sharing water and, in specific basins,
rules have developed on sharing water2 (Salman and Uprety 2002), power, and even scenic
beauty3 (Benvenisti 2003; Dellapenna and Gupta 2009; Fuentes 1999). Allocation rules
reflecting state practice are synthesized in 11 criteria included in the 1966 Helsinki Rules
adopted by the International Law Association (ILA 1966); and the 1997 United Nations
Convention on the Non-Navigable Uses of International Watercourses (UN Watercourses
Convention 1997).4 However, these criteria challenge the permanence of property rights
and historical rights and are politically contested, and the latter convention never entered
into force. These criteria may also be inadequate to deal with the new challenges (e.g.
climate change, and the need to reserve water for ecosystem services). The ILA’s Berlin
Rules tries to deal with some of these newer issues (ILA 2004).
Sometimes, the heated discussions on allocation can be eased by technical solutions
such as reservoirs, dams and inter-basin transfers. However, such constructions alter
ownership and access patterns, often transforming previous customary owners into victims
of submergence, and thus creating new rules of access and allocation, concentrating power
in the hands of the few (Conca 2006; Molle et al. 2009). For instance, the World Com-
mission on Dams’ recommendations, although heavily cited, were never seen as entirely
legitimate (because of the status of the Commission) (Dingwerth 2004) nor were they
actively and effectively implemented (Fink and Cramer 2008; Scheumann 2008; Dore and
Lebel 2010b).
Within the domestic context, allocation of resources between uses and sectors is highly
contested. Although the agricultural sector is the dominant user of water resources glob-
ally, decisions regarding how much water is allocated to this sector are highly political.
Some argue that water scarce countries should import food from water rich countries
(Luterbacher and Wiegandt 2005) while others would see this as challenging both notions
of food security and employment for local farmers. As water is seen more and more as an
economic good there is a possibility that water will be channelled more for its high-value
uses than its low-value uses, but this could lead to a shift from low value rural waters to
high value water use such as in industries and golf fields (Tarlock 2005). Allocation is
increasingly subject to ownership rules and market mechanisms. Even so, privatization has
not always been successful (Dellapenna 2009 for the United States, Schouten and Schwartz
2006; Tecco 2008 for the developing countries). In the developing world, allocation rules
are highly contested, not only because of the concentration of water ownership, but
2 For example, the waters of the Indus have been divided between India and Pakistan through allocating
three tributaries to India and three to Pakistan.
3 For example, the 1950 treaty between US and Canada allows the flow of the Niagara to be left undisturbed
to ensure that both countries can enjoy its natural beauty.
4 These criteria include the geography of the basin, the hydrology of the basin, the climate affecting the
basin, the past utilization of the waters of the basin, the economic and social needs of the basin states,
the population dependent on the waters, the comparative costs of the alternative means of satisfying the
economic and social needs of each basin state, the availability of other resources, the avoidance of
unnecessary waste, the practicability of one state to compensate the other, the degree to which the needs of a
basin state can be satisfied without causing substantial injury to a co-basin state.
384 J. Gupta, L. Lebel
123
because distribution networks are poorly organized and the ability of the poor to pay for
diverse water uses is limited. The struggle between community and formal rules of water
allocation are often accommodated, but not solved, within a pluralistic setting (Meinzen-
Dick and Pradhan 2002; Neef et al. 2006). It is also important to study the non-decisions,
the submerged politics and hidden contests that result in decisions regarding who gets what
and how much (Lebel et al. 2007; Molle et al. 2009). Many allocation mechanisms are of
this sort—illegal pumping, non-payment of use fees, politically connected benefits from
infrastructure, and so on—and their underlying narratives and discourses deserve study.
Discourses and rules at the national level are often influenced by practices at the
international level, through development cooperation (Matz 2008; Sacher and Windfur
2008), development banks (Hartje 2008) and international social movements (e.g. against
large dams). These aspects of globalization often attempt at creating homogenous rules that
then faces resistance (Nakashima and Chiba 2006).
Sharing the risks associated with water use and management is also complicated. For
example, the river Kosi breached its embankments in 2008 displacing 45,000 people in
Nepal and 3.5 million in one of the poorest states in India—Bihar. Allocating responsi-
bilities for such breaches is very complex within and between poorer governance entities
(Dixit 2009; Mishra 2008); not least because Bihar probably receives less attention within
India; and because of the institutional complexities (Shrestha et al. 2010).
Responsibility for harm caused is also contested. McCaffrey (2001) argues that although
the no-harm principle exists, it is not absolute; the harm caused must be significant, there
must be a failure of due care and diligence, and the complaint of the complaining state
should be seen as reasonable. Within states, the responsibility for causing harm has
developed differently in different parts of the world (Dellapenna and Gupta 2009).
There is no coordinated global scientific effort on water; and scientific work on water
access and allocation has been promoted by concerns regarding potential water conflict.
However, more scientific work has been undertaken on issues such as integrated water
resource management where access and allocation issues are only one of several (Conca
2006; Hooper 2005) and often trade-offs are made. The ‘virtual water’ discourse may
change the nature of the discussions (Neubert 2008). Social movements on water are
dispersed but have a long pedigree. Access to judicial systems of other countries on water
related issues exist in parts of Europe and the Southern African Development Community
countries and this increases the legal remedies available for those whose rights have been
violated; access in national contexts varies from place to place.
Although there is enough fresh water globally, regional variations in water combined
with institutionalized rules regarding water access through diverging historical processes,
imply that access and allocation issues continue to remain on the agenda. Even partially5
addressing the access issue by implementing the Millennium Development Goals may not
imply that the problem is addressed in the post-2015 period since climate change may
further exacerbate regional differences. Access and allocation in water is seen as cause of
both conflict and peace, and the resource itself is seen as highly valuable—’blue gold’
(Barlow and Clarke 2002)—and this will justify the political struggle to control it.
However, access and allocation issues may not always nicely fit into the integrated water
resource/river basin management paradigms (Hooper 2005) and optimal management
solutions may or may not lead to further inequities (Molle 2008).
5 The Millennium Development Goals only aim to halve the number of people without access; and not to
address the problem of people without access.
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4 Climate change governance
Unlike water, climate change governance is relatively young, going back only two decades.
While there have been attempts to frame the climate change issue as essentially an
environmental, technological and economic issue, the heart of the problem are the complex
distributional issues (Banuri et al. 1996; Gupta 1997). The 2009 Copenhagen conference of
the parties to the Climate Convention failed to adopt a legally binding agreement but
finally succeeded in bringing the issue to the top of the political agenda as some 120 heads
of state and government attended this meeting. This section discusses some general par-
adigmatic challenges, and then elaborates on the access and allocation dimensions before
briefly touching on the role of science.
The issue of climate change brings a number of struggles to the fore. The key conflicts
are: the struggle between current modes of development and what their environmental
impacts imply for development paradigms and production and consumption patterns in
general; and the struggle for control over the limited ecospace—the limited amount of
permissible greenhouse gas emissions which decreases every year and is possibly
exhausted by 2036 if the global community wishes to keep the climate change problem
within ‘safe’ limits (UNDP 2007). This struggle is not only witnessed at North–South level
but also within regions and countries. Both these call for multi-disciplinary research. The
third element of this power struggle is the element of denial—denying that impacts are
caused by actions elsewhere either through scientific sophistry (how does one differentiate
between climate variability and climate change; how can one attribute one impact to one
emitter and so on) or legal argumentation (how much harm is needed for the no-harm
principle; can the polluter pays principle be applied internationally). This is critical for
those causing harm to avoid potential lawsuits that can run into the billions of Euros.
Applying our framework to climate change, access can be defined in terms of access to
minimum resources and ecospace (the per capita minimum right to emit greenhouse gases)
and access to security (that is, that basic human rights are not jeopardized by the impacts of
climate change).
Climate change is caused by the emissions of greenhouse gases. In terms of mitigation
efforts, a debate has evolved around whether one should consider gross or per capita
emissions. In terms of gross emissions, China and India are among the top polluting
countries in the world. However, in terms of per capita emissions their emissions are much
lower. A gross emission approach would deny that each individual has a right to survive
and thus cause emissions. From an access perspective, a key question is what is the
absolute minimum level of emissions compatible with basic survival? The literature argues
that none of the Millennium Development Goals can be achieved without providing the
poorest access to a minimum level of energy and in that sense an implicit discussion on
survival emission rights is emerging.
In terms of adaptation, the access to security implies not having basic rights violated.
This is perhaps less contested, but the discussion is also much newer. This is the emerging
right that no violation of human rights should occur because of global environmental
problems. For example, children, symbolic of the future generation, are likely to have their
basic rights affected by climate change (Arts 2009). But as even present generations are
likely to be affected, climate change could imply a violation of the human rights of some
people by affecting their access to food and water and by influencing their livelihoods and
homes (UNDP 2007: 60).
As highlighted before, allocation has three dimensions: allocation of resources;
allocation of burdens and risks; and allocation of responsibilities for causing problems.
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With respect to climate change, the allocation of resources is about how the ecospace is
shared between countries. Because the ecospace is very limited (especially if global
emissions are to peak in 2015), the allocation discussion becomes very similar to the
access discussion. The per capita argument mentioned above is significant because it is
based on the idea that greenhouse gas emissions are closely linked to the development
levels of countries and peoples and that reducing emissions for the poorer countries
would impact on their ability to develop. This right to emit runs parallel to the demand
of the developing countries of the right to develop which was finally adopted in the
1986 Declaration on the Right to Development. This right is an ‘‘inalienable human
right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate
in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development’’ and
‘‘the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth
and resources’’ (UN Declaration on the Right to Development 1986). This idea is
referred to in the Climate Convention (UNFCCC 1992: Preambular paras. 3 and 23,
and Art. 4(5)) and the literature (Baer et al. 2008; Meyer 2000; Phylipsen et al. 1998)
but is contested because such a right is not seen as comparable to the right to education
(e.g. UNDP 2007, 50), or because it is incompatible with addressing the problem (e.g.
Weisslitz 2005), or because the right to development is for individuals and not states
and hence states cannot claim this right (Piron 2002), or because this right can be
translated into a ‘‘right to everything’’ (Kirchmeier 2006). The allocation of rights to
emit is likely to become a serious domestic issue as and when countries have to
determine who should have access and who not. A second related argument is that one
cannot compare survival emissions with luxury emissions (Agarwal and Narain 1991),
since there are few alternatives for those who are marginalized in comparison to the
rich.
In the early 1990s, there were negotiations on the relevant criteria for sharing per-
missible global emissions, as this was pertinent to emissions trading; however, the com-
plexity of the negotiations led these issues to be discarded from the agenda. By 1996 this
was again an issue. Emission allocations based on a per capita right provides the 150
developing countries the bulk of the emission rights. Emission allocations based more or
less on grandfathering6 principles provides the 40 developed countries the bulk of the
emission rights. The compromise in the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 is that the developed
countries received emission rights more or less equal to their grandfathered rights; while
developing countries have no limits. While this may sound like a fair solution, this has set
the precedent of grandfathering.
The allocation of environmental responsibilities from the perspective of ‘who is
responsible’ could be undertaken in terms of the polluter pays principle, the no-harm
principle, the liability, and compensation principles (Gupta 1997; Kanie et al. 2010).
Although pre-1990 political declarations indicate that funding would be needed to com-
pensate developing countries (Gupta 1998) and that such resources should be new and
additional to official development assistance, the need to avoid liability led to these
principles morphing into the euphemistic ‘‘special responsibility’’ idea (ECE Declaration
1990) and into the common but differentiated responsibility approach that is based more on
capabilities than liability (Sands 1995: 650). Finally, the euphemistic ‘leadership’ principle
was adopted in terms of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and
6 Grandfathering implies allocating emissions in accordance with current emission levels. The current
emission levels of the developed countries is very closely linked to their current emissions levels and they
have only to reduce their joint emissions by 5.2% in the Kyoto Protocol period of 2008–2012.
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respective capabilities (UNFCCC 1992, Art. 3).7 Moreover, this was only half-heartedly
implemented. Recent proposals for allocating responsibilities range from critiquing the
foundations of the common but differentiated responsibility and respective capability
principle (Weisslitz 2005; Adams 2003, shades of the life-boat theory—Hardin 1974) to
arguing that it is necessary (Rajamani 2000; Anand 2004; Batruch 1999) and translating it
into proposals (e.g. Baer et al. 2008; Meyer 2000; Phylipsen et al. 1998; Gupta 2008;
Agarwal 2000; Kanie et al. 2010). Clearly this is not only an argument that plays out at
international level, but will increasingly become important domestically especially in
countries with large disparities in wealth.
The allocation of burdens and risks from the perspective of the affected has not been the
subject of much discussion in the negotiations. The bulk of the serious impacts will further
marginalize the developing countries and poor communities living in marginal areas of the
earth. Changing rainfall patterns and rising sea levels will affect their livelihoods and lives
(IPCC-2 2007). The Convention adopted the notion of paying for full incremental costs
(Arts. 4.3 e; Art 4.4 and 4.8), which only implies paying for global benefits not local
benefits. Since adaptation was seen as generating only local benefits, there was no
incentive for the developed countries to pay for these (Bodansky 1993, 528). The need for
‘new and additional’ resources discussion has also evaporated in the current discourse on
‘‘mainstreaming climate change into development cooperation’’ (Gupta and van der Grijp
2010). However, at Copenhagen in 2009, the developed countries said that they would
raise 30-120 billion USD in the period up to 2020 to finance mitigation and adaptation
costs and this raises issues—about how these funds will both be raised and spent.
The equity discussion in the climate treaty serves as a fig leaf to hide the fact that those
responsible for causing the problem are not held accountable; and that the debate is marred
in power politics at the global level. Worse, with the adoption of the emissions trading
concept in the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, the polluter was paid. This was because instead of
the largest polluters being held accountable for their pollution, they were allowed to trade;
and those with the greatest systemic inefficiencies can gain the most in such a system. The
grandfathering principle is rooted in the prior appropriation system, which allows those
who appropriate a large proportion of the earth’s environmental space to get access to
larger allowances that they can subsequently convert into monetary gain through trade.
A challenge in the adaptation and mitigation discussion is that the more one mitigates
the less there is need to adapt, but also mitigation becomes less urgent since one needs to
adapt. Furthermore, if allowances are shared equitably, this will have impacts on both
mitigation and adaptation responsibilities. The tradeoffs between these approaches need
further research. These discourses are used in multiple manners in the climate negotiations.
Allocation challenges domestically have yet to start, but this debate will focus on who gets
what level of protection from the impacts of climate change and who will pay for this
protection.
In relation to access to processes, social movements on climate change are increasingly
gathering momentum. Cities and local governments have long cooperated under
7 The parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country parties should take the lead in combating
climate change and the adverse effects thereof. [emphasis mine]. The leadership dimension in the treaty is
also spread throughout the text calling for the developed countries to take action first (Preamble, Art. 3.1, 4),
to assist developing countries (Arts. 3.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5. 4.8, 11, 21), to recognize the growth needs of
developing countries (Preamble and Art. 3.4) and that the obligation of developing countries is conditional
on assistance (Art. 4.7).
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movements pushed by the International Coalition of Local Environmental Initiatives
(Burkeley and Betsill 2003). While the environmental movement cooperates and coordi-
nates under the banner of the Climate Action Network (Dombrowski 2010), increasingly
other groups are organizing themselves—such as Women for Climate Justice. A climate
justice movement is gathering momentum using both lobbying efforts and litigation to
push the climate change issue further. Access and allocation issues can to some extent be
addressed by technological solutions on the mitigation side (e.g. the electric car; second
and third generation biofuels) and on the adaptation side (e.g. geo engineering solutions).
5 Comparative analysis
Access and allocation issues in the water and climate change domains differ in several
ways (Table 2).
First, rules on water access and allocation have a longer history of institutionalization
from local through to international level—with at least 3,600 water agreements and 400
since 1820 (Oregon State University 2002)—although at global level, this is not the case.
Rules on climate change access and allocation have a very short history of institutional-
ization and are more developed at the international level than the national level. Global
water governance is a network of governance efforts (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2008; Conca 2006),
while climate change governance is one of the most centralized systems of governance.
Second, in terms of problem definition, access and allocation issues evoke different
challenges in the different fields. Access to water is primarily about access to basic
drinking water and sanitation services. Access in climate change is about access to
emission allowances for the poorest (survival emissions; right to develop), and access to
security to ensure that basic survival is not threatened by the impacts of climate change.
Access issues in the climate governance arena have higher political stakes. If the global
community were to allocate every human being a per capita right to emit greenhouse gases,
there would probably be no excess amounts over to debate the allocation issue. Besides,
such a process would call for large transfers of resources from North to South and is very
Table 2 Differences in problem definition of access and allocation between water and climate change
Water Climate Change
Access Right to drinking water and to sanitation
infrastructure/services
Right to develop for individuals: Access to
minimum emission rights for humans;
Access to security: basic survival should not
be impacted by climate change
Allocation Division of water resources between and
among peoples and among different uses;
Division of risks (e.g. floods); Responsibility
for harm (e.g. the no-harm principle)
Right to develop for nations: Need for ‘room to
grow’; survival versus luxury emissions;
Division of emission allocations between and
within countries; Division of responsibility
for causing harm; Division of responsibility
for impacts between and within countries
Science
and
Action
Science: strong epistemic community on
Integrated Water Resources Management,
but not necessarily on access and allocation;
Social movements: locally organized; Access
to courts: differential in different parts of the
world
Science: Strong epistemic community in
IPCC, but access and allocation issues are
given less attention; Social movements: from
local through national to global scale; Access
to courts: limited scope
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unlikely. While access to water is essentially a local issue although it can be interna-
tionalized; access in climate change is essentially a global issue.
Allocation in water is about how water is shared between its different uses for users
nationally and internationally, how risks are distributed and how the no harm principle is
interpreted. Allocation in climate change is about how emission allowances are shared
between and among countries over and above the basic rights, and how responsibilities for,
and the costs of coping with, the impacts are distributed between and among countries.
Third, access and allocation issues in water began with struggles at local through to
national level and have become a global multi-level issue over the centuries. In climate
change, the access and allocation issues are presently being contested at the global level
and the European Union level, but will soon become major sites of conflict at national and
local level.
Fourth, in terms of norms and discourses, the access to water issue is dominated by the
debate between privatization, property rights, historical rights and the human rights dis-
courses. The access to climate change discussion has been dominated by the debate
between survival and luxury emissions, the per capita and the grandfathering discourses
and more recently between discussions on the human right to climate change and the right
to development.
The international allocation of water resources is dominated by three sets of discourses:
(a) the sovereignty, no harm, and equity discourses (pushed by the legal community), (b)
the integrated river basin management paradigm (pushed by the water science community),
and (c) the virtual water trade discussions. The allocation debate in climate change has
been raging since the 1990s and the discourse that has won thus far is the ‘grandfathering’
discourse over the equity discourse on sharing emission allowances between countries.
Furthermore, in raising resources for adaptation (prevention, post-impact assistance, and
residual impacts) a number of equity discourses are being debated ranging from voluntary
contributions out of good will, through responsibility and solidarity principles. The allo-
cation discourses receive greater attention in both cases than the access discourses.
Fifth, in terms of power struggles, the two issues are very different. Power struggles on
water are essentially local and regional in nature, although patterns of power struggles may
repeat themselves from place to place. Climate change power struggles are global in
nature; and there are higher political stakes involved. These struggles will repeat them-
selves from global through to local level, as discussions about who has the right to emit and
how responsibilities for adaptation are to be distributed will play out at the different levels
of governance.
Finally, in terms of scale, patterns of problem solving in both water and climate change
reveal that while some ideologies transcend the level of governance (e.g. the privatization
discourse), others reveal that solutions are often limited to particular levels of governance
(e.g. countries may be more willing to discuss solidarity internally than globally).
6 Conclusion
This article set out to explore the concepts of access and allocation in theory and practice.
Based on this article, we argue that in the area of environmental governance, where
resources and ecospace are scarce especially in the context of rising populations and
consumption patterns, and the increasing recognition of the importance of maintaining
ecosystem services, the issues of access and allocation will become a significant element of
global to local politics. While the specific governance challenges vary by issue domain, for
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example because some have had a longer period of institutionalization and path depen-
dency than others or the combination of actors and knowledge available are different
(Lebel et al. 2010), and although this article focused on access and allocation in climate
change and water, it is clear that these are also highly contentious issues in other areas. For
instance, in biodiversity the debate is on access and benefit sharing; in the area of fishing
the problem is the multiple competing systems of governance (Burght 2010); in the area of
investment the debate is currently on whether rules tend to empower the investor at the cost
of others; in the area of trade battles are being, inter alia, fought about the role of intel-
lectual property rights in reducing access and compromising allocation issues.
Scarcity and the power struggles to control resources and ecospace, however, can be
dealt with in a number of different ways and different disciplines help provide guidance
about how to frame research questions and identify answers. There is a risk however in
mono-disciplinary approaches; multi-disciplinary approaches provide more room to
identify new and novel solutions to potential conflict situations. Evidence for this can be
found in integrative bargaining theory approaches. Hence, we propose a multi-disciplinary
framework with initial research questions to guide the study of access and allocation (see
Table 1 and Fig. 1). We believe that systematic application of such a framework to the
collection of data will facilitate analysis of how such scarce resources can be governed
more effectively.
Finally, a comparative study of how access and allocation are dealt with in different
fields of governance and in different levels and nodes of governance may reveal consis-
tencies, contradictions, and most importantly lessons that can be applied for sustainable
governance.
Access and allocation are contentious political issues in earth system governance
because they challenge existing property rights and claims. These topics are therefore a
rich area for further research and engagement.
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